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Law and Reform of the International Economic System 
 
By Chios Carmody  
 
 
There is likely to be continuing discussion of reform in the international economic system 
as Canada prepares to host two global leaders’ summits in 2010. Among topics currently 
under consideration by G8/G20 heads of government are the adequacy of international 
banking supervision, risk management, debt relief, a new global reserve currency, and the 
structure of major international institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO). What is the role of 
law in this? 
 
There are at least three considerations that governments and policy makers will want to 
take into account in answering this question. The first is the landscape of international 
economic regulation, which is today composed of a dense network of pre-existing 
obligations concerning monetary affairs, international trade and development that need to 
be simultaneously observed. Attention will have to be paid to ensuring that policies 
pursued in different fields of international economic law are coherent and mutually 
reinforcing.  
 
A second consideration is the nature of the “problem structure” devised to deal with an 
international economic issue as well as the nature of resulting “solution structure”. How 
well a network of rights and obligations can be “fitted” on to a particular problem, and 
how well soft law and informal mechanisms can be enlisted for the same purpose, will go 
a long way to ensuring the effectiveness of any resulting legal regime.  
 
Third, there is increasing recognition that international law works best when it is 
accompanied by regular reporting and verification. Simply put, international legal 
commitments function most successfully when the parties involved have a regular 
opportunity to meet and discuss their behaviour, with the possibility of sanctions in cases 
of non-compliance. Indeed, recent proposals for new mechanisms and regimes in 
international economic law have foundered on exactly this point.  
 
Each of the above issues requires some elaboration. Nevertheless, it is important to 
remember that what we are focusing on here is the role of law. Many noted commentators 
express the view that the chief role of law is to instill predictability, or what is sometimes 
referred to as the protection of ‘expectations’.  This purpose can be identified in the 
IMF’s stabilization facilities, in the World Bank’s loan and good governance programs, 
and in countries’ tariff concessions and service commitments under the WTO 
Agreement.   
                                                 
1 Associate Professor & Canadian National Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Western 
Ontario, London, Ontario. Email: ccarmody@uwo.ca. 
2 John Rawls observed, for instance, that in any free society individuals “have a claim to their better situation; their claims are 
legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the community is obligated to meet them.” John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice 103 (1971); “The law and expectations are related by a mutual feedback mechanism. Reasonable expectations affect the state 
of the law, and the state of the law affects reasonable expectations.” Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 109 
(1979). 
3 See China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WTO Doc. WT/DS339, 340, 342/R, para. 7.460 (18 July 2008), where 
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As we will see, however, predictability is introduced differently in different issue areas. 
Generally speaking, it is easier for a country to make a negative commitment not to do 
something than a positive commitment that binds it to behave in a certain way. 
Negotiators will find it useful to consider which of these options a projected international 
“obligation” will involve. 
 
It is also helpful to understand on whom exactly the obligation in question will fall. 
Today there is acute awareness that while states remain the principal subjects of 
international law, other actors such as international organizations and NGOs are relevant 
in the legal landscape and influence compliance. The success of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is a case in 
point. There, the global refrigeration industry was enlisted to eliminate the use of 
environmentally destructive chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as an industrial coolant. By the 
mid-1990s use of CFCs was phased out worldwide – several years ahead of schedule.4 A 
similar phase-out initiative has been introduced for single-hulled ships in the global oil 
tanker industry.5 In both instances, the cooperation of a few key players was of critical 
importance. 
 
In any legal scheme there also needs to be a clear idea of who will possess the resultant 
rights.6 Obligations create rights, but who will be in a position to enforce those rights can 
often make a difference between the success and failure of an international regulatory 
regime. In recent decades there has been a proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial 
mechanisms that seek to monitor and enforce compliance, that are either individual- or 
collectively driven, and involve steps that are either hard and/or soft.7 In virtually all of 
these schemes ‘perfect’ compliance is rarely feasible, or even desirable.8 The WTO’s 
legal system, for instance, permits legal action by any WTO member country for the 
breach of obligations by any other member, but the sheer range of obligations under the 
treaty and the varying constellation of interests mean that few obligations will be 
enforced to the letter. WTO members also recognize that there is a considerable 
penumbra of non-compliance and ‘conspiracies of silence’ on certain sensitive issues, 
leading to the observation that international economic cooperation under the WTO 
Agreement is more a process than a result.  
 
One further consideration about the role of law is that all legal systems must pay attention 
                                                                                                                                                 
it was observed that “the main purpose and objective of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 is to maintain the security and 
predictability of reciprocal market access arrangements manifested in tariff concessions. This, in our view, means that tariff 
concessions must be interpreted to benefit both the importing Member, China, and exporting Members.” 
4 Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (1991); Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses (1994). 
5 R.B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (1994) 
6 The assimilation of legal relations under the labels “rights” and “obligations” is probably guilty of generalization. Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld originally pointed out that a “right” potentially comes in at least four different forms: claim-rights, freedom-rights, power-
rights and immunity-rights. Similarly, an “obligation” comes in at least four correlative forms: requirement-duties, liability-duties, 
constraint-duties and disability-duties. These pairings suggest that any normative arrangement can be more diverse than the plain 
right-obligation dyad described in this article. See Philip Allott, Eunomia 159-162 (1990). 
7 A useful overview of these mechanisms is contained in the NYU Project on International Courts and Tribunals Synoptic Chart, the 
latest of which is available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf (accessed Jan. 12, 2010). 
8 “Compliance is not an on-off phenomenon. For a straightforward prohibitory norm like a highway speed limit, it is in principle a 
simple matter to determine whether a particular driver is in compliance … The problem for the system is not how to induce all drivers 
to obey the speed limit, but how to contain deviance within acceptable levels. And, so it is for international treaty obligations.” 
Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 17 (1995). 
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to factors beyond predictability. These can be thought of ‘realities’. A body of law 
therefore works at reconciling the law of predictability with the flexibility required by 
real conditions. A certain ‘pitch’ - or balance – is struck between these two goals. The 
degree to which a legal system is able to achieve this balance successfully is an important 
factor in its viability. For example, the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created as an arm of the World Bank in 1965 to resolve 
investment disputes between investors and host countries. In the last four decades it has 
resolved hundreds of such disputes. ICSID has attracted widespread adherence, in part, 
because arbitrators have refused to adhere to a one-size-fits-all definition of an 
‘investment’.9 Instead, they have looked to national definitions or to definitions contained 
within treaties, allowing a margin of appreciation that is considered respectful of national 
sovereignty. ICSID’s ‘give’ in this respect been identified as an important factor in its 
success.10  
 
1. The International Economic System Today: A Dense Neighborhood 
 
The existing landscape of international economic law is heavily built-up and, like the 
core of a great city, constitutes a dense network of pre-existing structures. Introducing 
anything new requires planning and consideration. 
 
There are at least three ways of dealing with conflict of norms in international law. One 
classic method is the latter-in-time doctrine (lex posterior) reflected in Art. 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.11 The doctrine holds that the most recent 
international engagement on a topic governs the legal relationship between the parties. 
However, trying to determine whether a new international agreement is, in fact, meant to 
supersede existing obligations can be problematic.12 A second method is the ‘special law’ 
or ‘special rule’ doctrine (lex specialis) reflected in Art. 5 of the Vienna Convention.13 
This doctrine holds that a more specialized international agreement prevails over a more 
general one. Again, however, it can be difficult to determine if one engagement is more 
specialized than another.14 Often the matter is left to be decided by characterization. A 
third method is to provide a conflicts clause that 1. either accords a firm priority between 
two international engagements or 2. avoids a straightforward priority and instead seeks to 
coordinate application of the two sets of obligations. An example of prioritization are 
rules under the WTO Agreement that give precedence to certain determinations of the 
                                                 
9 See contrasting decisions in Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, July 11, 
1997 and Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, July 23, 2001. In Fedax the panel found that the parties had consented to an ‘investment’ because of the extremely broad 
definition of the term included within the investment treaty. While the tribunal went on tî0çmfsider what an objective analysis!oâ 
investment 7ouMd0e.|cid- it based its decisikn0mn the subjecti6d Ìntenti•n3(of the parties. In SclAoé0the tribunal took an opposing 
view, ruling th#t ïbh'kuive crmtupia for in6esUment had |o fe met. It xrOgeeded to apply five indicators: duration, Coí}itment, risk, 
profit and seðurn inD$economic developmenô o$ the state, befora vkndi~g`|hat the(cOjtract was"fgs an inve3tmDnt. For criticism of 
this varying approach by YC AD pá~els see Devashish KziSlan, “A Notion of ICSID Investment,” hî´Todd WealEv (ed.), 
In~eSpoefu Treaty Arbitration and Internauiënal Law ¶1 j2008). 
10 Fabo5c Yala, “The NoTiï~ of Investment in ICSHD¤Case Law”, 22 J. Intl. Arbn 1 5 (2005). 
11 Art. 30(3): “WHeî a(d0pcz}hes to tJe¨tarlieR ôbeaty are partaeS$also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminat%d Nr 
suspended`… Uhe earlier treaty appmiás only to the extent that its provisions are compatible ui|i tHoóu of(tHa la|eR$treaty.” 
12 Intebn!|ional Law Com-isRion, FsaãmentataoN$?f`International Law, A/CN.4/L.68:  53 April 2p06 . 
13 Lex s`e#aalis is provided for in Art. 5 of the Vielni!ConventaïN$-n!tìe Law of Treaties, 18 I.L.M. &7i(h9969) and Art. 55 of 
the!Iêterla|hoNaì0Law Cï|}í3yigo’s Articles on State0R%{ponsyb)dity, U.N.G.A. A/RES/56/83 ¨12bDdcª 2001). 
??  fternational 
aw Ckm}kssi•nl(Fragmentation of INtåbnational Law, A/GN>2/\.603 51 (13 April ²00t). 
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IMF in monetary affairs that may have an impact on trade obligations.15 An example of 
coordination is found in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, the preamble of which provides that it should not be interpreted as “implying 
in any way that a change in the rights and obligations under other international treaties.” 
It then expresses the understanding that this principle “is not intended to create a 
hierarchy between this Treaty and other international agreements.”16 
 
These relatively straightforward rules can give rise to issues of great complexity in 
practice. Nevertheless, as Benedict Kingsbury has observed, coherence remains the norm: 
“states have remained unitary enough on their legal policy to avoid conflicts of obligation 
[and] the members of international tribunals have shown a commitment to systemic 
coherence and to comity, and the sense of a unified legal system with a unified 
international political order has generally been preserved.”17 Canadian policy makers 
would therefore do well to think about how a new set of obligations could be inserted into 
the existing landscape of international economic law in a way that coheres with and 
reinforces pre-existing commitments.18 
  
2. Regime Design 
 
A second general consideration relates to the ‘design’ of a legal regime. Much attention 
has been paid recently to means of optimizing the structure of rules and practices that 
together form international regimes. 
 
Generally speaking, the nature of the ‘problem structure’ arises from the way in which 
the interests in question are to be conceived. If a particular problem is thought about as 
disagreement over a ‘good’, then there are three forms of goods to be regulated: 1. private 
goods, 2. public goods, or 3. ‘privatized’ versions of public goods. Private goods are 
those considered to be held by countries individually, such as natural resources found 
within territorial boundaries. Public goods are those that belong to states as a group or to 
the international community as a whole (sometimes referred to as res communis), such as 
the deep seabed or the ozone layer. Privatized public goods are those which exist in their 
original form as belonging to states or humanity as a whole, but over which some form of 
privatization is permitted. The introduction of market mechanisms in international law, 
most evident in the Kyoto Protocol’s and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) scheme19, is an attempt to harness the power of economic 
                                                 
‚ G TT Art. XV:2. 
16!Tìe International Treaty on Plant Genetic Reskubaes for Food and Agriculture was signed 10 June 200² a,d un4mred$i~vo fnrçe for 
Canada 29 Zu.m 280 * A!fñrther$ehcmple is ppo~hded in Ar|. 60 of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversipy<"whhcì 
states in somawxct stronger ôer/s tha4 p@0ties shal| /jserve t`eIv commitments under the Convention and all otleb"treaties to 
whiCh dhey are pap a4X in good faatH( and “withïutbsubmrlhnating this Coovántion to any otheS pbeaty •`hi  they0s(ill foster 
mutuan {tpportiveness betwmeN$this  onWention and the treaties to whicH ôxey are parties …”  
17bBenedéctbKingsbury, “Thg Anternational Legal Order in Cane & Mark Tõsh,et (eds),, Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 271 at 
281 (20 3i& 
18!Ið could be, for instance, t`aT$coordinating cLaõces"mafht be used to claziF} tln0Ü`lativg xsIïòy6y of oeó obligations.0S/ee 
support for thd ðimv tha4 iOternational law is to be interpreted systemyc!dly comes crûo Ar|. 7!*3)(c) of the Vienna ConvmnTmon 
on the Law of Trea4ieR, which prgvI`es that “There shall0b!(dcken into account, together with th' contept • (c) any(rEhevant rules 
of international law applicable in the remaðionq jdtween the parties.” See Campbell McLachlan, “The Princitlu"of Systemiã 
I,teg2atIoê and ArtiClå031(3)(c) o& tIe Vienna Convention”, 54 Y.  L®A. 279 )Aôril 2005). 
19 UnEev0the Kyoto Protoboè, Annex I coUnôbies have committed themselves ôo ,ational orbjoint reduction targets. T`e GDM 
allïwsbthe creation of nmw garboj spedits by developanG$eoi{âi/$ reduction proze#|s in non-annex I countries, while JY !dlows 
project)s`gcific krE`its to be(cOjverted from existing credi|s aarned within other annex I countries. 
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forces to meet international goals. 
 
In designing a ‘solution structure’, consideration then needs to be given to the range of 
interests that may be involved in exploiting the ‘good’ in question. One example from 
domestic experience involves Canada’s West Coast fishing industry. Total allowable 
catch quotas set by the federal government for the region during the 1980s led to 
widespread dumping of unwanted fish, misrepresentation of catches, and the closure of 
the groundfishery in 1995. The remedy for this initial failure involved re-opening the 
fishery in 1997 but divided the coastal area into more than 50 sectors, assigning 
transferable quotas, and requiring that all ships have neutral observers on board to record 
catches.20 
 
The design of solution structures in international law in future may draw on the work of 
Elinor Ostrom, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economics, who has highlighted how 
communities in different parts of the world have evolved ways of managing public 
property, or ‘common pool resources’.21 Ostrom’s work challenges conventional wisdom 
that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central 
authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, 
pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, she concludes that the outcomes are, 
more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. Resource users frequently 
develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle 
conflicts of interest. 
 
An international level, the analogous task in relation to international economic law will 
involve the assignment of rights and obligations in a way that is sensitive to both actual 
and ideal notions of the ‘good’ involved. For instance, international attempts to discipline 
the risk-taking activities of major financial institutions have not borne fruit so far because 
of continuing disagreement over the appropriate point of regulation and limited 
appreciation of international financial well-being as a single ‘good’.22 The central 
problem is one of polycentric governance. Ostrom is clear that a broad diagnostic 
framework is necessary and identifies a number of variables that are associated with self-
organization.23 At the same time, she is clear that there are many efforts currently 
underway to decentralize the management of public goods and that one-size-fits-all 
solutions rarely succeed.  
 
                                                 
20 See C.W. Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries (2006). Since 1997 the Governments of Canada and B.C. have assigned 
groundfish trawl quota to individual licence holders. To ensure that British Columbia's coastal communities continued to benefit from 
the West Coast groundfish trawl industry a B.C. Groundfish Development Authority (GDA) was created. The GDA now administers a 
system designed to ensure fair crew treatment, aid in regional development, promote the attainment of stable market and employment 
conditions, and encourage sustainable fishing practices. Under the scheme 10 per cent of individual vessel quotas are set aside by the 
Minister of Fisheries to be allocated back to licence holders to reflect the interests of the communities and the labour force. An 
additional 10 per cent is added to the licence holders' allocation at the start of each fishing season. On the advice of the GDA, a 
portion or all of this quota can be withdrawn from the licence should the licence holder be found to be treating crew members in an 
unfair manner. However, a report by Ecotrust Canada disputes the view that individually transferrable quotas are a panacea for the BC 
and global fishing industry, noting that their implementation in the BC groundfishery has led to absentee ownership and quota leasing, 
the development of a false sense of security to fishers, the facilitation of privatization and a growth in the capitalization of fisheries. 
See “A Cautionary Tale of ITQ Fisheries”, available at www.ecotrust.ca/fisheries/cautionarytale (accessed Jan. 11, 2009).  
21 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990). 
22 Noel Sacasa, “Preventing Future Crises” 45:4 Finance & Development 11-14 (2008). 
23 See Elinor Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems” 325 Science 419, 420 
(2009). 
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3. Reporting and Verification 
 
For several decades the design of international regimes has been accompanied by a 
realization that reporting and verification of international engagements is critical to their 
success. The features of many modern treaty regimes, such as transparency, dispute 
settlement and capacity building, matter little if they are not accompanied by what has 
been referred to as “an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public.”24 
 
Opportunities for meaningful communication between the parties matter immensely. 
With communication comes the formation of a ‘we’, a collective ethos as well as 
agreement over the boundaries of the collective good involved. The 'we' then being well-
defined, countries are more likely to follow rules, to be cooperative and, occasionally, to 
sanction one another in order to help the collective continue. The most extreme sanction 
is obviously expulsion. At the same time, in the realm of international economic affairs 
formal punishment rarely pays off. In most cases it will be largely symbolic. The example 
of ineffective sanctions for failure to meet the Euro’s strict convergence criteria is a case 
in point.25  
 
A related observation is that policy making in the fi'lf gg international economic law 
has`tO âu accompanie` r{ an authmnTic0qpirit of commitment. Thiq e`y 
soufd Prétel(but policy making cannot be regazdE` as aî o2portunity for window-
dresséngl0T(mre must be a genuioå¤i,vestment by governments in solttíons 4o 
Flobal"0únC.ems. Here is where the promise a.d Qeril of the growing eîdhusiasM æ•r 
‘metrifIcádion’ becomes ipPerent. 
                                                 
24 Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 25 (1995). 
25 As part of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact leading to the creation of a European Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, EU 
member states agreed to two convergence criteria leading to the creation of a common currency: an annual budget of no higher than 3 
percent GDP and national debt lower than 60 percent GDP. Several countries that are part of the Union later breached these criteria. 
Punitive proceedings were begun against Portugal and Greece in 2002 and 2005, respectively, but fines were never applied. 
Subsequently, France and Germany also rain excessive deficits, but no action was taken against them. 
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umCers can al,{wQzolicy makEró a`legree of control over An yssue, but only to the 
extent that those numbers accuòctely disclgsE$the underlying stata •d things. If 
they"dg!not, or )f Oumbers get turned into a(sOvt!oâ ‘game’ (as is arguably now 
happening witx$'tmbal fishing 3toBks and with many /f Uhe Millenium Development 
Goaló),bthen cynicism and disengagement Beçyn to tckm!over.26 There has to re`i 
rgadhstic apPráysal of underlying proJlÅys and a$guluine willingness to do something 
about thEm®0 
 
4. Somå C-ncluDiîw Thoughts 
 
In the early 19903 tIere(wAw a ‘boomlet’ of akaDamic interest in 
implemejtqvioj,0aompliance and effectiveness studies related to international law.27 The 
result has been a subsisting interest in ‘regime design’, even if the new international 
institutions created in the aftermath of the Cold War have not always fulfilled their aims.  
 
In thinking about the role of law, however, it is important to remember that perfect 
compliance is rarely feasible and that shortcomings are often an opportunity to pinpoint 
weaknesses and engage in fine-tuning. Awareness of the existing landscape of 
international economic regulation, a clear idea of both the ‘problem-’ and ‘solution-
structures’ that are possible, and a regular framework of communication, are all essential 
in the success of any regime of international economic law. Canadian and foreign policy 
makers would do well to recall these points going forward in 2010. 
                                                 
26 The Millenium Development Goals are a series of 8 goals established at the U.N. Millenium Summit in 2000 designed to radically 
improve life conditions for the world’s least fortunate citizens by 2015. Early research completed by the UN Development Program 
has shown that progress towards attaining success by the 2015 deadline is not promising. See Centre of Concern, “Where Are We 
Now” in More than a Numbers Game? 14-21 (2005). Also Amir Attaran, “An Immeasurable Crisis? A Criticism of the Millennium 
Development Goals and Why They Cannot Be Measured” (2005) 2(10) Policy Forum 955-9. 
27 See for instance Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990); Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, 
The New Sovereignty (1995). At the same time, a number of conferences on international law examined the subject of its 
effectiveness. See for instance American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law: 
Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness (1997). 
